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We report results of experiments designed to test the predictions
of the best reply process. In a Cournot oligopoly with four ￿rms,
the best reply process should theoretically explode if demand and cost
functions are linear. We ￿nd, however, no experimental evidence of
such instability. Moreover, we ￿nd no diﬀerences between a market
which theoretically should not converge to Nash equilibrium and one
which should converge because of inertia. We investigate the power of
several learning dynamics to explain this unpredicted stability.
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It is well known that the adjustment process suggested by Cournot (1838)
for an oligopoly, namely that each ￿rm plays a best reply to the other ￿rms￿
previous output, is not stable in the general case. Theocharis (1960) shows
that in oligopolies with more than two ￿rms and with linear demand and
cost functions the best reply process does not converge: if there are three
￿rms, ￿nite oscillations around the equilibrium positions occur, and with
four or more ￿rms the process shows explosive ￿uctuations.
Subsequently, it has been shown that this result is not robust to small
changes in the assumptions. In particular, the system can become stable if
adjustment to the best reply is only partial (McManus and Quandt, 1961),
or if marginal cost are increasing (Fisher, 1961).
In this experiment we test whether convergence to the equilibrium really
depends on such intricate details of the model. We propose two treatments
for a four￿￿rm oligopoly with linear demand and cost functions which allow
to test for the stability of the Cournot adjustment process. Only in treat-
ment A is instantaneous and perfect adjustment possible. In treatment B,
￿rms must stick to last period￿s quantity with a probability of 1/3. In Huck,
Normann, and Oechssler (1999) we prove that such a system with inertia is
stable. Thus, the predictions are clear. In the ￿rst case, the process should
oscillate perpetually between two extreme values. In the second case, the
process should converge to equilibrium.
We ￿nd, however, no noticeable diﬀerence between the two treatments.
In both cases average quantities are slightly above, but still rather close to
the Cournot equilibrium outputs. The modal choice of individual quantities
is at the Cournot outcome in both treatments. In experimental oligopoly
markets, Theocharis￿ instability result does not occur.
There may be several reasons for this (unpredicted) stability. One reason
could be that subjects follow a process that smooths best replies, e.g. like
￿ctitious play. Another reason may be that subjects tend to imitate what
others do. Social psychologists (e.g. Asch, 1952) have shown a long time ago
that imitation is an important factor for explaining learning behavior.1 We
￿nd evidence that imitation of the average quantity of other ￿rms plays an
important role in our experiment. Fictitious play, on the other hand, does
not explain the data particularly well. Our regression results suggest that,
1Recently, imitation (of last period￿s most successful action) has also been studied in
the context of oligopoly by Vega￿Redondo (1997).
1in the aggregate, subjects mix between playing best replies and imitating
others.
These results may be compared to an interesting experiment by Cox and
Walker (1998). They also analyze convergence of play in two treatments of
which only one is theoretically stable. In Cournot duopoly the best-reply
dynamic is stable only if ￿rm 1￿s reaction function is steeper than ￿rm 2￿s in
the neighborhood of the equilibrium (with ￿rm 1￿s quantity on the horizontal
axis). Cox and Walker show that there is a sharp distinction between these
two cases supporting the theoretical results. Play is almost never near the
theoretically unstable equilibrium but converges nicely to the theoretically
stable equilibrium.
Another related paper is by Rassenti et al. (2000) who ran several ￿ve-
￿rm oligopoly experiments. Their central issue is whether repeated play
will yield convergence to the unique and theoretically unstable static non-
cooperative Nash equilibrium. Surprisingly, and in contrast to previous
studies and our own, they observed convergence only at the aggregate level.
There is no convergence at the individual level. A possible explanation for
this is that Rassenti et al. introduce substantial asymmetries in cost. A
further diﬀerence to our paper is that they do not have a control treatment
which is theoretically stable.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces
the experimental design. Section 3 oﬀers theoretical predictions, while Sec-
tion 4 presents the experimental results. In Section 5 we conclude.
2 Experimental design
In a series of computerized2 experiments we studied a homogeneous multi￿
period Cournot market with linear demand and cost. There were four sym-
metric ￿r m si ne a c hm a r k e t .Q u a n t i t i e sc o u l db ec h o s e nf r o ma￿nite grid
between 0 and 100 with .01 as the smallest step. The demand side of the
market was modelled with the computer buying all supplied units according
to the inverse demand function
pt =m a x {100 − Qt,0}, (1)
2We are grateful to Klaus Abbink and Karim Sadrieh for providing us with their soft-
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= 19.8,i∈ I, (4)
yielding a price of pN =2 0 .8. The collusive outcome would be at qC
i = 12.375
resulting in a price of pC =5 0 .5.
The number of periods was 40 in all sessions and this was commonly
known. Subjects possessed all essential information about the market, i.e.
they were informed about the symmetric demand and cost functions in plain
words.3 Furthermore, subjects had the possibility to use a ￿pro￿t calcula-
tor￿, which served two functions. A subject could enter some arbitrary ￿total
quantity of other ￿rms￿. Then he could either enter some amount as his own
quantity in which case the calculator informed him about the resulting price
and his resulting personal pro￿t. Or, he could press a ￿Max￿￿button in which
case he was informed about the quantity which would yield him the highest
payoﬀ given the total amount of others. Additionally, the calculator com-
puted price and pro￿t for this best response.4 This function was designed
t og i v et h eb e s t - r e p l yp r o c e s st h eb e s tc h a n c ep o s s i b l e .T h ec a l c u l a t o rw a s
used, on average, in two of out three periods.
After each market period subjects were informed about the total quantity
the others had actually supplied, about the resulting price and their personal
pro￿ts. Additionally, they were reminded of their own quantity. When
deciding in the next period this information remained present on the screen.
Results of earlier periods were, however, not available, but subjects were
allowed to take notes and a few did.
There were two treatments. In treatment A subjects could adjust their
quantities in every period. In treatment B we introduced some inertia: Af-
ter round one, chance moves, which were independent across individuals,
determined in each period whether a subject was allowed to revise his quan-
tity decision. This was done by a ￿one￿armed bandit￿ which appeared on
3Since we recruited many non-economics students as subjects, we were careful not to
use any formulas or technical terms in the instructions.
4In the experiments we did not use the expression ￿best response.￿
3the screen showing three equiprobable numbers ￿0￿,￿1￿, and ￿2￿. If ￿0￿
occurred no adjustment was allowed. Hence, the probability for allowing
revision was 2/3.
The experiments were conducted in April and May 1997 in the computer
lab of the economics department of Humboldt University. All subjects were
recruited via posters from all over the campus. Almost half of the sub-
jects studied ￿elds other than economics or business and had no training in
economics at all.
In each session eight subjects participated, constituting two groups of
four ￿rms. Subjects were randomly allocated to computer terminals in the
lab such that they could not infer with whom they would interact in a group
of four. For both treatments we had six groups of subjects ￿ making a total
of 48 subjects who participated in the experiments.
Subjects were paid according to their total pro￿ts. Pro￿ts as in (3) where
denominated in ￿Taler￿, the exchange rate for German Marks (500:1)w a s
known. Since we considered the Theocharis result as a possible outcome in
treatment A, we wanted to make sure ￿ besides the usual bankruptcy prob-
lems ￿ that subjects would not be frustrated by low or negative payoﬀs.5
So, additionally subjects earned a ￿xed payoﬀ of Taler 150 each round. The
average payoﬀ was about DM 37.84 which at the time were roughly $21.
Experiments lasted 60 minutes including instruction time.
Instructions (see Appendix A) were written on paper and distributed in
the beginning of each session. After the instructions were read we conducted
one trial round in which the diﬀerent windows of the computer screen (see
Figure 1 in Appendix B) were introduced and could be practiced. When
subjects were familiar with both, the rules and the handling of the computer
program, we started the ￿rst round.
3 Theoretical predictions
In this section we analyze the implications of several learning dynamics ￿
bestreply (BR), ￿ctitious play (FP), imitation of average behavior (AV), and
a mixed process. For each theory we analyze whether the process converges
and, if so, where it converges to. Furthermore, we calculate for each process
theoretical autocorrelations, which can then be compared to the empirically
5See Holt (1985, p. 317) for the argument that the usual promises in the instructions
that one can earn a ￿considerable amount of money￿ might bias subjects against zero-
pro￿to u t c o m e s .
4observed ones.
3.1 Best-reply processes
The basic best-reply process, suggested by Cournot, assumes that each ￿rm
plays a best reply to the other ￿rms￿ output from last period. If all players







, we get the following process
for total quantities




Clearly, the system explodes. Due to the non￿negativity constraint for quan-
tities, individual quantities eventually oscillate between zero output and the
monopoly output. Total quantities oscillate between zero and four times the
monopoly output, i.e. Qt = 198.
Consider now a best reply process with inertia and let θ denote the prob-
ability that a ￿rm must stick to its previous quantity. The inertia stabilizes
the process. In Huck, Normann, and Oechssler (1999, Prop. 1)w es h o wf o r -
mally that the resulting Markov process converges globally to the Cournot
equilibrium for any θ ∈ (0,1) . T h ep r o o fi sb a s e do nt h et h e o r yo fp o t e n -
tial games (Monderer and Shapley, 1996) and proceeds by constructing an
improvement path from any arbitrary state to the equilibrium. The equilib-
rium is, of course, an absorbing state with respect to best-reply dynamics.
While the process with inertia is stochastic, we can calculate an average
autocorrelation coeﬃcient by noting that (on average)
qt
i = θqt−1












Thus, there should be negative autocorrelation as long as θ < 3
5.I nt r e a t -
ment B we have θ = 1
3. Hence, theory predicts a negative autocorrelation of
−2
3 if all subjects play best replies.
An alternative way of smoothing a best reply process is through ￿ctitious
play (FP) beliefs (Robinson, 1951). In its basic version players choose in each
round a best reply against the relative frequency of the combined quantities
Qτ
−i of the remaining ￿rms in periods τ = 1,...,t − 1. Given the linear
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It is well known (see Monderer and Shapley, 1996) that ￿ctitious play con-
verges to a Nash equilibrium in potential games, i.e. in our case to the
unique Cournot equilibrium. With inertia parameter θ,w eh a v ef o rt o t a l
quantities









Hence, for θ = 1/3 an autocorrelation of 1
3 − 1
t−1 results. Without inertia
(θ = 0) the process yields an autocorrelation of − 3
2(t−1).
3.2 Imitation
Research in psychology and social biology shows that individuals often ￿learn￿
by imitating others especially in complex environments. In a famous exper-
iment Asch (1952) found that people who are faced with similar decisions
tend to follow the decisions of other members in their group. In our exper-
imental setting subjects could not observe individual quantities. But they
were able to observe total ￿ and therefore average ￿ quantities of the re-
maining ￿rms. It seems reasonable that subjects who are uncertain about
what to do and observe that the average quantity of the other ￿rms deviates
from their own quantity, imitate this average quantity ￿ thinking along the
line of ￿everyone else can￿t be wrong￿. A preference for cautious behavior
and a taste for conformity could be further reasons for imitating the average.







If all subjects were to follow this rule, clearly the process is bounded above
and below by the highest and lowest initial quantities. Without inertia the
process would converge simply to the average of all starting values, as can














With inertia the process depends on the realizations of the randomization









which yields Qt = Qt−1 independently of θ. Thus, total quantities should be
constant on average and the autocorrelation coeﬃcient should be 1.
3.3 Mixed process
In anticipation of our experimental results we derive here some properties
of a mixture of best reply and ￿imitate the average￿. Apart from the fact
that such a mixed process seems to suggest itself given our data, it could
result because all subjects actually mix, or ￿ more plausibly ￿ because some
subjects play best reply and others imitate (see Gale and Rosenthal, 1999,
for a justi￿cation of a similar mixed process).6 Generally, if α denotes the
weight given to best replies and 1−α the weight given to the average quantity












Thus total quantities follow the process




This diﬀerence equation is stable if α < 4
5. If it is stable, it converges to
the Cournot equilibrium. Autocorrelation is positive for α < 2
5 and negative
otherwise.
With inertia the mixed process yields (on average)
qt
i = θqt












Summing over i gives








Thus, for θ = 1/3 convergence is assured independently of α, and average
autocorrelation is given by 1−5
3α. We summarize the convergence properties
and theoretical autocorrelations in Table 1.
6They consider a population in which most people imitate the average but some ex-
periment on a trial & error basis. Since the presence of experimenters has similar eﬀects
as that of best-reply players, it is not surprising that they ￿nd convergence to the Nash
equilibrium and stability in the large. However, due to the stochastic nature of experi-
mentation some interesting instabilities arise in the small.
7Table 1: Theoretical predictions
































Note: α denotes the weight given to best reply.
Table 2: Summary Statistics













Note: Mean35 (Mean20) is the average total quantity measured over the last 35 (20)
periods and over all six groups in one treatment. Standard deviations in parentheses.
Avg σt−t0 denotes the average standard deviation of total quantities from round t to t0.
4 Experimental results
Table 2 reports average total quantities for the last 35 and the last 20 periods,
respectively.7 The mean quantity in both treatments is only slightly above
the Cournot￿Nash quantity of 79.2. Standard non￿parametric tests show
that there are no signi￿cant diﬀerences between the mean quantities for
treatment A and B at any reasonable signi￿cance level.
Also shown are average standard deviations of total quantities over the
￿r s ta n dt h es e c o n dh a l fo ft h ee x p e r i m e n t . 8 It can be seen that the standard
deviations of total outputs are considerably smaller in the second half of the
experiment. This is signi￿cant for both treatments (p =5 .8% in treatment
A, p = 1.4% in treatment B (Wilcoxon test)) and indicates convergence.
Clearly, there is no tendency for explosive behavior in treatment A. Some-
7The complete data set is available at http://www.wiwi.uni-bonn.de/with2/oechssler
8For each group of ￿rms we calculated the standard deviations of total quantities over
time. Table 2 reports the treatment averages of these standard deviations. For the tests
below each group counted as one observation.










A BR 21.5 52.0 4.6 5.2 4.11 2.6
FP 49.7 22.5 4.2 0 4.7 18.8
AV 35.3 46.3 2.5 0.5 2.4 13.0
B BR 26.4 43.0 5.4 5.4 3.11 6.6
FP 46.0 22.1 5.3 0 4.3 22.3
AV 35.7 44.6 4.11 .0 2.3 12.3
Note: Only rounds in which subjects were allowed to adjust their quantities are
included.
what surprisingly, average standard deviations are even lower in treatment
A, although, this diﬀerence is not signi￿cant. Finally, Table 2 also reports
empirical autocorrelation coeﬃcients which are analyzed below.9
So far we have only considered group outcomes. Individual quantities,
however, are also quite close to the Cournot Nash prediction of qN
i = 19.8.
Figure 2 shows the frequencies of individual quantity choices over all periods.
The modal choice in both treatments is at the bracket containing the Nash
outcome.
[place Figure 1 about here]











where at−1 is the point prediction implied by playing myopic best reply (BR),
￿ctitious play (FP), or imitate the average (AV), respectively. Obviously,
zt
i = 1 follows in case of perfect adjustment, while zt
i < 0 implies a severe
qualitative violation.10 Table 3 shows the relative frequency distribution of
the z￿values.
9Thus, there is a distinct diﬀerence between our results and those of Cox and Walker
(1998) as they ￿nd a signi￿cant diﬀerence between a treatment that should theoretically
converge, if best replies are used, and a treatment which should not converge. Further
experiments are required to sort out this diﬀerence.
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9Some observations are immediate from Table 3. While in the majority
of cases subjects do adjust in the direction of BR (and to some lesser extent,
in the direction of AV), complete adjustments are rare. Only in about 5%
of cases do subjects adjust completely to the best reply. Fictitious play,
on the other hand, hardly seems to capture behavior adequately since for
both treatments almost 50% of adjustments are in the wrong direction.
Overshooting (z>1.2) is also more frequent than for the other adjustment
rules.
These ￿ndings might be compatible with a model in which subjects ad-
just partially in the direction of BR (see also Rassenti et al., 2000),
qt




i denotes subject i￿s best reply given the other ￿rms￿ quantities in
t−1 and γ1,γ2 > 0. However, this model cannot explain the 21.5 or 26.4 %
of cases in which adjustment pointed away from BR (z<0).
Therefore, we have estimated a model which allows for a combination of























i is the best reply against ￿ctitious play beliefs (given in (8)), and
it−1
i denotes the average quantity of the other ￿rms￿ output in t − 1. Note
that a subject who strictly played a myopic best reply every period would
have β1 = 1 and βk =0 ,k6= 1. Analogously, β3 = 1 for someone who follows
￿ctitious play and β2 = 1 for someone who always imitates the average.
We have estimated (18) with weighted least squares (WLS) using t0.2
as a weight for all observations.11 To account for individual diﬀerences in
learning behavior we added subject intercept and slope dummies.12 Table 4
shows the results of the regression with pooled data of all subjects.
The results for both treatments are quite similar. The coeﬃcients β1
and β2 are signi￿cant at the 1% level in both treatments. The coeﬃcients
for ￿ctitious play are not signi￿cantly diﬀerent from zero in treatment A,
and signi￿cant only at the 10% level in treatment B. Given the size of the
coeﬃcients it seems that subjects played a mixture of best reply and ￿imitate
11Goldfeld￿Quandt tests indicated that variances were signi￿cantly lower in later
rounds, which can be expected if learning behavior converges. To correct for heteroscedas-
ticity we used WLS with weights chosen so as to maximize the log￿likelihood function.
12Using a ￿backward￿ procedure to eliminate insigni￿cant dummies.
10Table 4: W L SR e g r e s s i o n sw i t hp o o l e dd a t a





















Note: * signi￿cant at 10%, ** signi￿cant at 1% level; standard deviations in parentheses.
DW = DurbinWatson statistic. Only periods in which subjects were allowed to adjust
their quantities are included.
the average￿, which is evidence in favor of the ￿mixed process￿ analyzed in
Section 3.3.
Doing simulations, we found interesting qualitative properties of the
mixed process (13) and ￿ctitious play. Both converge very quickly to the
Cournot equilibrium. Take, as an example, the values of β1 and β2 in treat-
ment A, but normalized such that they add up to one: α =0 .428/(0.428 +
0.315) ≈ 0.57. For this value, the mixed process would converge to a 1%
interval of the Cournot equilibrium values in only 6.5 periods on average.13
Similarly, ￿ctitious play takes between 4 and 12 periods to converge to this
1% interval. On the other hand, the pure best reply process (with iner-
tia) converges in 25.8 periods to the 1% interval on average. For a typical
simulation of these processes see Figure 2. While a pure best reply process
explodes, the best reply process with inertia converges to the Nash equilib-
rium but convergence is slow. The ￿ctitious play as well as the mix of best
reply and imitation converge much faster.
Finally, we can compare the theoretical autocorrelations given in Table
1 with the empirical ones shown in Table 2. Clearly, neither a pure best
reply process nor a pure imitation process comes even close to the empirical
autocorrelations.14 However, the mixed process does much better if we use
for α the estimated values from Table 4. Likewise, ￿ctitious play produces
autocorrelations quite close to what is observed in the experiment. For large
t, the theoretical autocorrelations with FP converge to 0 in treatment A and
to 1/3 for treatment B.
13For starting values uniformly distributed between 0 and 100.
14A similar observation is made by Rassenti et al. (2000) who conducted oligopoly exper-
iments with ￿ve ￿rms. They ￿nd convergence at the aggregate level, but autocorrelation
is positive, too. Like us they conclude that a pure best-reply process cannot explain the
data.
115 Conclusion
In this paper, we report results of an experiment designed to test whether
the best reply adjustment process causes unstable markets as predicted by
Theocharis (1960). We ￿nd no sign of instability. Play converges roughly to
the Cournot equilibrium prediction in both treatments, whereas a best-reply
process would predict stability in treatment A and explosive ￿uctuations in
treatment B.
We explore several explanations for our result based on alternative learn-
ing processes. In particular, we test a basic version of ￿ctitious play and
a process based on a mix between playing best replies and imitating the
average quantity of the other ￿rms. While ￿ctitious play captures the over-
all properties of our data quite well (convergence to Nash equilibrium and
the autocorrelations), it does not capture the individual round by round
decisions of subjects as shown by the very low hit rates and insigni￿cant co-
eﬃcients in the regressions. The regression results rather support the mixed
process between best reply and imitation. Of course, one should not judge
such an ad hoc learning theory based on just one experiment. Further ex-
perimental research is needed to assess the explanatory power of the mixed
process.
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Appendix A: Translation of instructions
Welcome to our experiment. Please read these instructions carefully. In the
next 1 or 2 hours you will have to make some decisions at the computer. You
can earn some real money. But please be quite during the entire experiment
and do not talk to your neighbors. Those who do not follow this rule will
have to leave and will not get paid. If you have a question please raise your
arm.
13You will receive your payment discretely at the end of the experiment.
We guarantee anonymity with respect to other participants and we do not
record any information connecting your name with your performance.
You can operate the computer with the keyboard or the mouse. Before
the experiment there is enough time to make yourself familiar with the
computer in a trial round. Money in the experiment is denominated in
￿Taler￿. At the end we exchange your earnings into DM at a rate of 500 T
= 1 DM. The experiment is divided into several rounds. As said we start
with a trial round. The real experiment starts with round 1.
You represent a ￿rm which produces and sells a certain product. Besides
you there are 3 other ￿rms which produce and sell the same product. Your
task is to decide how much to produce of your good. The capacity of your
factory allows you to produce between 0 and 100 units each round. Produc-
tion cost are 1T per unit. All units (also those of the other ￿rms) are sold
on a market (like on a stock exchange or in an auction).
For this the following important rule holds: The price can be between
100T and 0T. The more is sold on the market in total, the lower is the price
one obtains per unit. To be precise the price falls by 1T for each additional
unit supplied. If ￿ this is only an example ￿ the other ￿rms supply together
10 units and your ￿rm supplies 3 units, then total quantity is 13. The
resulting price is 100 − 13 = 87. If the total quantity were 90, the price
would be 100 − 90 = 10. Proﬁtp e ru n i tis the diﬀerence between the price
and the cost per unit of 1T. Note that you make a loss if the price is lower
than the per unit cost. Your pro￿t in a given round results from multiplying
the pro￿t per unit with your supplied quantity.
In each round the quantities of all ￿rms are recorded and the resulting
pro￿ts are calculated. In each round you will be told your pro￿t. Pro￿ts
f r o ma l lp e r i o d sa r ea d d e da n dt h es u mi sp a i do u tt oy o ui nc a s ha tt h e
end. Additionally you receive a ￿xed payment of 150T each round. This
will be added to your pro￿t each round.
In the ￿rst round you decide on a quantity you want to produce and sell.
In all further rounds chance decides whether you have the opportunity to This ¶ for treat-
ment B only. revise your quantity. The computer has a mechanism which is comparable
to a ￿one￿armed bandit￿: If you draw a ￿1￿ or a ￿2￿, you may change
your quantity. If you draw a ￿0￿, you may not. That is, you may change
your quantity in 2 out of 3 cases. With a ￿0￿ the quantity of last period is
supplied automatically again. Note, that your quantity might be ￿xed for
14several rounds. Following a ￿1￿o ra￿ 2 ￿y o um a yr e v i s ey o u rq u a n t i t y .
In this case you will receive the following information. You are told the
total quantity of the other ￿rms last period, and last period￿s price.
Additionally, you have access to a pro￿tc a l c u l a t o r . The pro￿t calculator
is shown on the last page of the instructions. It has two functions: 1.I t
calculates your pro￿t for arbitrary quantity combinations. That is, you can
enter two values, a total quantity for the others (button ￿A￿) and a quantity
f o ry o u r s e l f( b u t t o n￿ I ￿ ) ,a n dt h em a c h i n et e l l sy o uh o wm u c hy o uw o u l d
earn. 2. You can let it calculate for arbitrary quantities of others (button
￿A￿) the quantity at which you would make the highest pro￿t (button ￿M￿).
You can use the machine as much as you want before each decision. Before
we start you will have enough time to get to know the pro￿t calculator
directly at the computer.
Everything we have explained to you holds for the other ￿r m sa sw e l l .
In fact, you are all reading exactly identical instructions.
The experiment lasts for 40 periods in total. Afterwards you will receive




Translation (from top to button, left to right):
Bar at top: Firm 3, Round 2, Balance: 341.88 T
Window at top: Result of round 1, Total quantity of other ￿rms: 71.10,
The price: 16.60, Your quantity: 12.30, Your pro￿t: 191.88 T, Fixed
payment: 150.00 T.
Lower left window: Proﬁtc a l c u l a t o r , Enter total quantity of other ￿rms,
Enter your quantity, Price, Pro￿t, Exit pro￿tc a l c u l a t o r :E s c .
Lower right window: Enter quantity, Please enter your quantity, open







































































































































Figure 2: BR + Imit shows the simulation of equation (11)w i t hα = .57.
BR is the regular best reply process, and BR with inertia is the best reply
process with θ = 1
3.F Pi s￿cticious play.